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Abstract:  Until recently, the position of quarterback in the National Football 
League (NFL) was not an option for black athletes.  Today many teams employ black 
quarterbacks, a development that might suggest race is no longer relevant when it comes 
to the evaluation of signal callers in the NFL. To examine this contention, this paper 
explores the relationship between player salary, performance, and race at the quarterback 
position over the period 1995 to 2006. We find that blacks and whites play this position 
differently.  Specifically, black quarterbacks are more likely to run with the football.  This 
skill, though, is not compensated in the market.  Consequently, there is evidence that 












  The story of Jackie Robinson illustrates that discrimination was once an issue in 
professional sports.  Is it still a problem today?  Although numerous studies have been offered 
examining discrimination in professional team sports like baseball and basketball, there is little a 
priori evidence that discrimination remains a problem in these sports.  Consequently, it is not 
surprising that much of the recent research on the topic offers very mixed results with respect to 
the subject of discrimination.  Depending upon the issue examined and the methodology 
employed, studies have found evidence of discrimination against blacks1, discrimination against 
whites2, or no discrimination at all.3
  The story of professional football is different.  Specifically, black quarterbacks have 
historically been a relatively rare occurrence in the National Football League (NFL).  The first 
was Willie Thrower, who threw eight passes for the Chicago Bears on October 18, 1953.  These 
were the only eight passes Thrower ever attempted.4 It was not until 1968 that Marlin Briscoe 
became the first starting black quarterback, leading the Denver Broncos of the American 
Football League.5   
  In the 1970s the black starting quarterback came to the NFL.   The first was James 
Harris, who was drafted by the Buffalo Bills of the AFL in 1969.  In 1970 the NFL and AFL 
merged.  Consequently, when Harris attempted 103 passes for the Bills in 1971 he became the 
first black quarterback to received “significant” playing time – where significant is defined as 
attempting at least 100 passes in a single season -- in the history of the NFL.6     Harris was cut 
from the Bills after the 1971 season and did not play professional football in 1972.  But in 1973 
he joined the Los Angeles Rams, performing well enough for the Rams to be named to the Pro 
Bowl in 1974.  Over a ten year career that began with the Buffalo Bills of the American Football 
League in 1969, and ending with the San Diego Chargers in 1979, Harris appeared in 83 games.       
  Unlike Jackie Robinson in baseball, though, Harris did not open the floodgates for black 
quarterbacks. In the entire decade of the 1970s, only eight times did a black quarterback attempt 
100 passes for an NFL team in one season.  Harris did this four times.  Joe Gilliam, the first 
black quarterback to be named a team’s starter at the onset of a season, did this in 1974.  Dave 
  1Mays, in a back-up role, attempted 121 passes for the Cleveland Browns in 1977.  And Doug 
Williams, a first round draft choice for the Tampa Bay Buccaneers in 1978, attempted more than 
100 passes in both 1978 and 1979. 
  Williams played five seasons for Tampa Bay, leading the team to the NFC championship 
game in 1979.  From 1983 to 1985, though, Williams did not take a snap at quarterback.  In 1987, 
due to an injury to the Washington’s starting quarterback, Williams was named the starter for the 
Redskins7 towards the end of the campaign.8  As starter, Williams led the Redskins to the Super 
Bowl title in 1988, becoming the first black quarterback to start for a team in the NFL’s biggest 
game.  Despite the success of Williams, the quarterback position in the NFL continued to be 
primarily a position for white players only in the 1980s.  After Williams, only Vince Evans, 
Warren Moon, Randall Cunningham, and Rodney Peete received significant playing time at the 
quarterback position in this decade. 
  By the end of the 1993 season, only eight black quarterbacks had ever received 
significant playing time in the NFL.  When we look at Table One – which list all 28 black 
quarterbacks to ever attempt 100 passes in a single season (as of the end of the 2006 campaign) – 
we see that in mid-1990s blacks began to make substantial progress at this position. In 1994, Jeff 
Blake became the starting quarterback for the Cincinnati Bengals.  The next season, Blake, Moon, 
Evans, Cunningham, and Peete all attempted at least 100 passes.  This marked, as Table Two 
indicates, the first time that more than three black quarterbacks received significant playing time 
in the same season. 
  Continuing with Table Two we see that from 1996 to 2000 the number of black 
quarterbacks attempting at least 100 passes in a single season rose from five to eleven.  The mark 
of eleven was again matched in 2001, 2003, and 2006, but never exceeded.  
  So relative to the 1970s and 1980s, blacks appeared to have more opportunities.  Still, it 
appears the participation of blacks have not changed much since 2000.  Plus, even with an 
increase in the number of black quarterbacks, this position is still dominated by whites.   From 
2000 to 2006 there were 251 instances where a quarterback attempted 100 passes in a single 
season.  Of these, 68 were offered by black quarterbacks, or 27% of the population.  When one 
  2notes that 65% of the NFL is black,9 it is easy to conclude that progress still remains in the effort 
to integrate the quarterback position. 
  The number of blacks participating at this position certainly suggests the possibility of 
discrimination.   To further address this subject, we will focus our attention on two issues.   First 
we wish to evaluate the performance of black and white quarterbacks on the field of play.  Are 
there differences in the average performances of each population?  Beyond on-field productivity 
is the larger issue of worker compensation.  The employment data suggests that blacks are still 
under-represented at the quarterback position.  Are there similar disparities in the wages paid to 
members of each population?  
 
1. Comparing  on-field  performance 
  Goff, McCormick, and Tollison (2002) investigated the integration of Major League 
Baseball in the 1950s and 1960s.  One issue these authors examined was the relative performance 
of black and white baseball players.  Via a comparison of slugging percentages, evidence was 
presented suggesting that the typical black baseball player outperformed his white counterpart in 
the first decades of integration.  Do we see the same pattern in the NFL? 
  To address this issue one must have a measure of player performance.  Player 
performance data exists in abundance in the sports of baseball and basketball, two sports that 
have been frequently investigated by economists interested in the issue of racial discrimination.  
Like these two sports, a number of metrics exist to evaluate the productivity of an NFL 
quarterback.  
  The plethora of metrics, though, presents a problem.  Which measure should one 
employ?  Studies of baseball tend to follow the lead of Gerald Scully (1974) and utilize an index 
on performance10 like slugging percentage.11  The advantage of this metric is that it is commonly 
cited and simple to understand, although its connection to runs scored and wins is relatively 
weak.12   
  For quarterbacks, the most commonly cited statistic is the NFL’s quarterback rating 



































Where    COMP = Completions         PASSYDS = Yards passing 
    PASSTD = Touchdown passes thrown  INT = Interceptions thrown 
  PASSATT  =  Passing  attempts 
 
  Beyond a lack of intuition, one should note that the quarterback rating may be biased 
against black quarterbacks.  To understand this contention, one should note that the quarterback 
rating system is actually only a measure of a signal caller’s passing ability.  Only four statistics, 
completions, yards, touchdowns, and interceptions are employed, with each evaluated per passing 
attempt.  Contributions made with the quarterback’s legs are not considered.   
  We collected data on 309 quarterbacks who attempted at least 100 passes in one regular 
season from 1971-2006.   Given that quarterbacks appeared in multiple seasons, our sample 
initially includes 1470 distinct observations.  To address differences in rushing ability, we first 
calculated the number of Plays where the quarterback participated.  Specifically, according to the 
NFL’s definition of Plays, we aggregated passing attempts, rushing attempts, and sacks.  We then 
examined the percentage of Plays that were rushing attempts.  Our 28 black quarterbacks offered 
145 season observations.  In this sample 11.3% of the time the black quarterbacks ran with the 
ball.  In contrast, white quarterbacks only ran with the ball on 6.7% of their Plays.   
  When we turn to rushing attempts and yard per game we see a similar story. The average 
white quarterback from 1971 to 2006 ran with the ball twice per game, gaining an average of 7.3 
yards.  When we look at our sample of black quarterbacks we see that 84.1% exceeded the white 
average with respect to rushing attempts per game while 80.7% exceeded the white average for 
rushing yards per contest.  Overall, the average black quarterback ran with the ball 3.8 times per 
contest and gained 19.4 rushing yards.   
  To put this in perspective, consider the case of Warren Moon in 1997.  At the advanced 
age of 41, Moon ran 17 times out 575 Plays, for a rate of 3%.  In 1998, a young 22 year old white 
quarterback Peyton Manning, only ran 15 times in 612 plays, for a frequency of 2.5%.  Manning 
was not alone.  Of the white quarterbacks examined, 11% did not run as often as an old Warren 
  4Moon in 1997.  Only one black quarterback, Doug Williams in the last year he played in the 
NFL, failed to run as often as Moon.  Such results highlight a key difference in the performances 
of blacks and whites at the quarterback position.  White quarterbacks can often play without their 
legs.  A similar opportunity does not often exist for black quarterbacks. 
  Given the formulation of the quarterback rating, a key offering of black quarterbacks is 
ignored.  Consequently to assess the impact of this difference, we employed a measure of 
performance detailed in Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2006) and Berri (2007).  These works detailed 
models of both points scored and points surrendered in the NFL.14  Such models were used to 
derive the value in terms of net points, of passing yards, rushing yards, passing attempts, rushing 
attempts, sacks, interceptions, and fumbles lost.  The value of each factor is reported in Table 
Three. 
  The values can be used to measure by Net Points and QB Score.  Net Points simply 
involves multiplying the values in Table Three by each quarterback’s production of each statistic.  
QB Score is a simpler measure, calculated as follows: 
  QB Score = All Yards – 3*All Plays – 30*All Turnovers 
Where   All yards = Passing yards + Rushing yards – Yards lost from sacks 
  All Plays = Passing attempts + Rushing attempts + Sacks 
  All Turnovers = Interceptions + Fumbles lost 
  The simpler measure is derived from normalizing the value of plays and turnovers 
around one yard.  For example, as seen in Table Three, each play is worth about 3 yards.  As 
noted in Berri (2007), the correlation between QB Score per play and Net Points per play is 0.98. 
  With measures in hand, we offer Table Four, where we present our evaluation of the 
average performance of black and white quarterbacks.  This table begins by looking at this 
position prior to the leap in participation seen in the mid-1990s. Specifically we compare the 
average performance of black quarterbacks from 1971 to 1993 to what we saw on average from 
whites playing this position.   
  From 1971 to 1993 the average black quarterback was better with respect to the NFL’s 
quarterback rating, which again only considers what a signal caller does with his arm. When we 
incorporate the quarterback’s ability to run, the difference becomes even greater. Black 
  5quarterbacks in the earlier time period created more points both per play and per game.  And not 
surprisingly given our result with respect to points, blacks also have a higher QB Score and QB 
Score per play.   
  When we look at more recent years we see that both black and white quarterbacks 
improved.  With respect to the NFL’s QB Rating, though, whites are now slightly ahead of 
blacks.  But again, this metric ignores what a quarterback does with his legs.  When the rushing 
game is added, we again see that blacks are more productive than whites. A t-test of equality of 
mean values of rush yards earned by white and black quarterbacks comprehensively rejects with p 
value of 0.000.   
 
2.  Modelling Race and Compensation in the NFL 
  We are not the first to examine racial discrimination in the NFL.  The first studies were 
offered by Mogull (1973, 1981).  More recently Kahn (1992) and Gius and Johnson (2000) 
offered studies with somewhat contradictory results.  Specifically, in a study of worker 
compensation for the 1989 season, Kahn (1992) reports a wage premium for white players.  In 
contrast, in a study of wages paid in the 1995 season, Gius and Johnson (2000) present evidence 
that minority players are paid more than whites.  More recently, a working paper by Doran and 
Doran confirm the work of Gius and Johnson with respect to every position but quarterback.  In 
a study spanning data from 1994 to 2003, Doran and Doran report a premium paid to minorities 
at every position except that of the signal caller, where whites are reportedly paid additional 
wages for similar performances. 
  To understand these results, it is useful to review the standard approach to uncovering 
the existence of salary or wage discrimination. The simplest method proceeds by estimation of 
coefficients on a dummy variable to distinguish race. This assumes that the impacts of 
productivity measures on salary do not vary by race. If significant and negative, the race dummy 
represents a downward intercept shift in salary for the racial group in question. In a more 
sophisticated approach, researchers examine the relationship between pay and productivity, 
seeking to uncover differences in this relationship due to race by means of slope dummy 
  6variables.  If one finds that statistically significant racial differences exist, the researcher 
concludes that evidence of discrimination has been uncovered.  All other factors that may 
influence salary must be accounted for in the salary model.  If not, the estimation and 
interpretation of racial differences is problematic.  
  We begin our discussion with our dependent variable, salary.  We want to compare 
determinants of quarterback salary for players that are some distance apart in time, as our sample 
period covers 1995 through to 2006. For salary data in standard occupations, deflating nominal 
salary by a consumer price index is sufficient for this. But salaries in the NFL have considerably 
outstripped consumer price inflation, fuelled by lucrative broadcast contracts. Consequently we 
deflate salaries by the average NFL wage, taken is season averages from large samples of NFL 
players shown in files on Rod Fort’s sports business web site, 
www.rodneyfort.com/SportsBusiness. 
Table Five shows some descriptive salary statistics.  Total salary includes base salary and 
bonuses related to signing and performance.15  Unlike other sports, only the signing bonus is 
guaranteed in the NFL.  Hence NFL players who do not perform can see their salary in the 
future reduced or eliminated.  Consequently, although a player may have signed his current 
contract sometime in the past, current pay is tied quite closely to very recent past performance.  
Players who do not perform according to expectations can expect teams to either force the player 
to sign a new contract for less money or be cut from the team.  
An examination of the distribution of salaries for blacks and whites reveals that little 
disparity exists in the compensation of each population at the median or below. But at the 75th 
and 90th percentiles, it seems that white quarterbacks earn more than black quarterbacks. 
Consistent with this, the salary distribution for black quarterbacks is less compressed and has less 
skewness and kurtosis compared to the distribution for white quarterbacks. The potential for 
discrimination is apparent in that black quarterbacks do not appear to generate the very high 
rewards in the upper right hand tail of the salary distribution. Of course, it could simply be that 
the best black quarterbacks are not as able as the best white quarterbacks. Multivariate regression 
  7is needed if we are to reveal genuine disparities by race, controlling for player productivity and 
other influences.   
The specification of our multivariate regression depends upon our measure of worker 
productivity.  In section 3 below, we offer results from estimation with four sets of productivity 
measures. For now, we summarise our measures by the vector PERFORMANCE and note that 
this can be a single measure (e.g. quarterback rating) or a group of measures. We would note that 
current season measures of productivity always generated insignificant coefficients, either singly 
or in groups. Prior season productivity measures do appear to influence player salary.16
This finding emphasizes the importance of recent performance in a pre-determined 
multi-period salary bargaining. However, we experimented with career-based cumulative 
measures of productivity and could find no systematic influence from these. We would note that 
performance by NFL signal callers is surrounded by much statistical noise reflecting both player 
injuries, as well as the stochastic element in the performance of team-mates on which the 
quarterback’s performance will depend. The regular season itself is short with just 16 games.  So 
variations in form and bad luck on critical plays will play a larger role in performance 
measurement than it would in a sport like baseball, where ‘true’ performance can be revealed 
over a 162 game season. 
  Beyond our measure of performance we consider a collection of additional regressors.17  
These regressors can be divided into three groupings: player characteristics, team characteristics, 
and race. 
  Additional Player Characteristics 
  As is standard in Mincer-type sports salary regressions, the first we note is a measure of 
experience. This will be total years of experience in the League including the current season 
(EXP). The predicted concave relationship between productivity and experience is captured by a 
squared term (EXPSQ).  Years of experience, though, does not distinguish between time as a 
starter and time on the bench.   We would expect starters – who would be involved in more plays 
than a back-up -- to demand additional pay.  To capture the impact of being a starter, we also 
include as an independent variable a quarterback’s CAREER PASS ATTEMPTS. 18  
  8Quantity of play is not the entire story.  Perceptions of quality are also important.   Prior 
literature on NFL salaries has stressed the role of draft status as a predictor of salary (Kahn, 
1992). The best college football players are drafted into NFL franchises in seven rounds. Ceteris 
paribus, a quarterback drafted in the first round is predicted to have more ability than a round six 
draftee. This is partly self-fulfilling since teams devote considerable coaching resources to ensure 
that their 1st round draft picks are nurtured into genuine on-field talent.19 Kahn (1992) used the 
reciprocal of draft round. But we experimented with dummy variables for each round and found 
significant coefficients for the first two rounds only. Hence, we include DRAFT ROUND 1 and 
DRAFT ROUND 2 as our measures of draft status. We assume that the impact of draft status 
only holds if the player remains with the team that drafts him; once the player is traded, the 
impact of draft status is lost. If the player does stay with his drafting team, then the impact of 
draft status remains for the duration of tenure with that club. 
  NFL players are broadly eligible for free agency after four seasons of experience. After 
three years, players have restricted free agent status in which teams holding the player’s contract 
are allowed to make offers that at least match those available on the free agent market. 
Experimentation revealed that the impact of veteran or free agent status does not depend on 
whether we use three or four years as the qualifying period. Hence, we denote players with at 
least three years NFL experience by a coding of one in the dummy variable, VETERAN.   
  A feature of our data is that quarterbacks that are traded seem to receive lower salaries. 
Some players experience a salary reduction on joining a new team followed by enhanced salary in 
later years. This suggests that free agent trades are seen as risky by acquiring teams and that they 
need to be convinced of a new quarterback’s ability before committing to a large contract. We 
capture the effect of player trades on salary by the dummy variable CHANGE TEAM. This 
takes a value of one for the season immediately after the player is traded.20  
The final player characteristic we consider is another measure of perception of 
reputation.  Each year NFL fans, players, and coaches nominate a set of players to appear in the 
Pro Bowl. This is an indicator of fan and peer esteem and can be thought of as a reputation 
attribute. We use PROBOWL to indicate a player who has appeared in this special game, with a 
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rest of the player’s career. Hence, we hypothesise that once gained, Pro Bowl reputation persists 
even if the player does not subsequently receive nomination. 
  Team Characteristics 
  Beyond characteristics unique to the player, we also consider some characteristics of the 
team employing the player.  The team’s market size is proxied using log population of the local 
SMSA (LNSMSA).21  We have reason to expect population and salary to have a fairly weak link  
Team revenues in the NFL are shared to a greater extent than in other pro sports. The broadcast 
contract is negotiated centrally by the NFL, with equal shares of sales of broadcast rights. Gate 
revenues are shared between teams with the away team receiving 40 percent of revenues from 
ticket sales. Merchandise sales are organized centrally with revenues equally shared amongst 
teams. With these features of revenue distribution firmly in place, we do not expect the impact of 
local market size to be important.    
  Although marginal revenue might not vary much from team to team, the marginal 
productivity of a quarterback depends upon the quality of his teammates.  A quarterback needs a 
strong offensive line to protect him from an aggressive defense and give him sufficient time to 
throw the ball. He also needs good receivers to catch his passes.  
  The role of team complementarity in pro sports is an under-researched topic in sports 
economics (Borland, 2006). For the National Hockey League, Idson and Kahane (2000) captured 
complementarity of team-mate performance as total team performance measure minus the 
magnitude of a particular player’s contribution. Significant impacts of team-mate productivity on 
player salary were found.  
  In the NFL, such a direct approach is not possible for two reasons.  First, performance 
measures are not available for the offensive line.  Additionally, it is difficult to separate the 
production of wide receivers from the production of quarterbacks. Do yards gained in a pass 
player ‘belong’ to quarterback or wide receiver? Both are responsible for a successful play.  
  Rather than artificially attribute team performance measures to groups of players, we 
take as a proxy for the ability of team-mates to be the total salary of a particular unit on a given 
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position players on the team. These are wide receivers, tight ends and running backs. The ability 
of a set of skill position players is assumed to be correlated with OFFENSE SALARY. If more 
able skill position players raise quarterback performance, and hence salary, the coefficient on 
OFFENSE SALARY is expected to be significant and positive.  
  We should note that NFL franchises have to adhere to a league-wide salary cap, or a 
maximum payroll set as a proportion of team designated gross revenues. If a team spends more 
on its skill position players, it may decide to pay less to quarterbacks, given their ability. The ‘thin’ 
market for NFL quarterbacks, with just 32 pro teams, might lead to reductions in quarterback 
salaries which are realizable, given monopsony power. If so, the coefficient on OFFENSE 
SALARY will be significant and negative.22     
  Race and the Model 
Our final variable is of course the focus of our study.  Player race is indicated by the 
variable BLACK determined by visual inspection of player photographs. In our sample, all 
quarterbacks were unambiguously either white or black.  As noted above, the use of an intercept 
dummy to explore race- based disparities in salary is limited since it necessarily assumes that 
returns to player attributes are equivalent for each sub-group. A more sophisticated approach is 
to explore interaction terms between BLACK and the PERFORMANCE vector.  
  Equation (2) reports the specific salary model we will estimate.  
lnSAL=   b0 + b1*PERFORMANCE+ b2*EXP + b3*SQEXP + b4* CAREER PASS 
ATTEMPTS + b5* DRAFT ROUND 1 +   
b6*DRAFT ROUND 2 + b7*VETERAN + b8*CHANGE TEAM + b9*PRO BOWL + 
b10*OFFENSE SALARY + b11*LNSMSA+ b12*BLACK + b13*PERFORMANCE + 
b14*BLACK*PERFORMANCE + et       (2) 
   
 
3.   Empir cal Findings  i
  Salaries of players in professional sports are typically more highly skewed than in other 
occupations (see e.g. Hamilton (1997) for NBA and Lucifora and Simmons (2003) for Italian 
soccer). Interestingly, the kernel density for black quarterbacks is less skewed than for white 
quarterbacks in our sample. Summary measures of skewness and kurtosis in Table Five show 
considerable differences.  With a kurtosis value in excess of three, the white salary distribution 
  11displays excess kurtosis and is leptokurtic. These properties are incompatible with a normal 
distribution. The white salary distribution might be influenced by some outlier observations for 
one player, Peyton Manning who received a much larger salary than his peers. But even when 
Peyton Manning is removed from the sample the differences in skewness remain.   
  Given the skewness in our data we follow the lead of Hamilton (1997) and Leeds and 
Kowalewski (2001) and explore these distributional differences below using quantile regressions 
(Koenker, 2005). At the median, quantile regression minimises the sum of absolute differences 
from the fitted regression line. A particular advantage of this estimation method is that we can 
assess impacts of covariates at different points of the salary distribution, not just the median. This 
is particularly relevant when our descriptive statistics in Table Five seem to be pointing towards 
salary differences between black and white quarterbacks at the 75th and 90th percentiles.     
Before turning to our findings with respect to race and player productivity, it is useful to 
note our results with respect to our other regressors.  We find that salary is positively impacted 
by draft positions 1 and 2, veteran status, pro bowl appearance during a career, career pass 
attempts and offense salary. Other offense players appear to generate significant 
complementarities with quarterback productivity. Players who change teams experience salary 
reduction, ceteris paribus. In addition, salary increases initially with experience, but declines as 
expected as a player reaches the end of his career.  The turning point on experience is in the 
range of seven to ten years, implying age levels of 28 to 32. Population, as we expected, is not 
found to be a significant predictor of salary.  
  What of quarterback performance and race? We consider four sets of performance 
variables. In Table Six, we use the quarterback rating from the previous season. For the 25th 
percentile and above, this has a significant impact on salary. Also, for quantiles at median and 
above the interaction term BLACK*QB RATING has a negative and significant coefficient. This 
must be qualified by the positive coefficient on the intercept term BLACK at median and 75th 
percentile. At these quantiles, the quarterback ratings at which black players are estimated to 
suffer a salary reduction for extra rating, compared to white quarterbacks are 75 and 66, 
respectively, which would be viewed as at best mediocre performances within the industry. 
  12Inspection of the distribution of players reveals that the majority of black quarterbacks in the 
neighbourhood of median and 75th percentile salaries exceed these performance levels.  
 However,  the  pseudo  R2 values in Table Six are rather low and it is not necessarily the 
case that front offices of NFL franchise negotiate player salaries with quarterback rating as an 
important performance indicator.  An alternative, simpler quarterback performance metric the 
aforementioned QB Score. 
  Compared to the quarterback rating, QB Score weights pass yards differently and 
includes running attempts. In Table Seven, we replace quarterback rating by QB Score and find 
that the fit of the model improves substantially, at all estimated quantiles. The QB score has a 
significant impact on salary at all estimated quantiles. The BLACK*QB SCORE interaction term 
has a significant, negative impact on salary inside the tails of the distribution, at 25th,50th and 75th 
percentiles. Since the BLACK intercept term has an insignificant coefficient at all quantiles, we 
conclude that an increased QB Score is associated with salary reduction for black players 
compared to whites, inside the tails of the salary distribution. 23  
  In section 1 above, we highlighted the fact that black quarterbacks tend to run with the 
ball more than their white counterparts. Is this difference in performance reflected in estimated 
quarterback salary? To investigate this question, we need to decompose the broad measures of 
quarterback rating or QB Score into their components. In Table Eight, we disaggregate 
performance into five measures: PASS YARDS, TOUCHDOWNS PER ATTEMPT, 
COMPLETIONS PER ATTEMPT, INTERCEPTIONS PER ATTEMPT and RUSH YARDS.24 
Of these, we predict positive coefficients on all variables with the exception of 
INTERCEPTIONS PER ATTEMPT, for which we expect a negative coefficient. When a 
quarterback’s pass is intercepted it both deprives his team of a scoring opportunity and sets the 
opposition up with an opportunity to score points.  
  We also interact BLACK with PASS YARDS and RUSH YARDS. 25The results in Table 
Eight show significant impacts of PASS YARDS at all estimated quantiles. The coefficient on 
TOUCHDOWNS PER ATTEMPT is, perhaps surprisingly, only significantly positive at the 75th 
percentile. The coefficient on COMPLETIONS PER ATTEMPT is insignificant at all quantiles 
  13while the coefficient on INTERCEPTIONS PER ATTEMPT is only negative and significant at 
the 90th percentile. This suggests that the very best quarterbacks do suffer a salary penalty for the 
interceptions that they create. The only performance measure that has systematically significant 
coefficients across the salary distribution is PASS YARDS. Our results suggest that pass yards 
achieved are the most fundamental performance measure by which NFL quarterbacks are 
rewarded. 
  In Table Eight, we find that the marginal salary returns to additional rushing yards is not 
significantly different from zero for all quarterbacks, black and white, at all estimated quantiles. 
Note that the coefficient on RUSH YARDS remains insignificant when the interaction term with 
BLACK is removed. These results imply that black quarterbacks are not rewarded for their 
distinctively greater rushing contributions, a result suggestive of salary discrimination against 
black quarterbacks. The lack of significance on coefficients of RUSH YARDS further suggests 
that the improved fit of the model in Table Seven, with QB Score replacing quarterback rating, is 
not due to the inclusion of rushing yards in the QB Score measure but is more likely indicative of 
inappropriate (for salary determination) weighting of pass yards in the quarterback rating 
formula. 
  Our evidence of salary discrimination is reinforced by the significant, negative coefficient 
on BLACK*PASS YARDS at 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles, in Table Eight. Black quarterbacks at 
median salary or above suffer reduced salary compared to white quarterbacks with similar 
characteristics, with the size of salary penalty rising with the number of pass yards. The BLACK 
intercept dummy has an insignificant coefficient at all estimated quantiles, so there is no offset to 
performance-related salary disadvantage to black players.  
  Table Nine presents results from estimation of a parsimonious model with the generally 
insignificant terms TOUCHDOWNS PER ATTEMPT, COMPLETIONS PER ATTEMPT, 
INTERCEPTIONS PER ATTEMPT all removed. As before, the coefficients on RUSH YARDS 
and BLACK*RUSH YARDS are insignificant at all estimated quantiles.  Hence, the 
parsimonious model sustains the finding of discrimination against black players for their 
particular running skills. 
  14  Also in Table Nine, the coefficient on BLACK*PASS YARDS is negative and significant 
at the five per cent level at the median and 75th percentile. This coefficient is marginally 
significant at the 25th percentile (p value = 0.055). Again, in some region of the salary distribution, 
black players suffer a salary disadvantage that rises as performance levels, assessed by pass yards, 
increase.     
 
4. Concluding  Observations 
  What have we learned about quarterbacks and race?  The argument that the NFL is truly 
color-blind is bolstered somewhat our examination of performance and our initial study of 
compensation.  Although there does exist differences in style between black and white signal 
callers, in more recent years the difference in overall production has narrowed.  Furthermore, 
average salaries are quite similar. 
  Of course, the NFL does have a history of discriminating against black quarterbacks.  
Even today, although black quarterbacks are not uncommon, the number of blacks at this 
position is far below the numbers we observe at other positions.  The story with respect to 
compensation is also not entirely positive.  Using a quantile regression approach, we see evidence 
that neither white nor black quarterbacks receive additional reward for extra rush yards achieved. 
Since black players appear to be more adept at rushing than white quarterbacks, this suggests a 
lack of reward for an additional skill that black quarterbacks bring to their teams. 
  We also find that black players receive less compensation than white counterparts for 
additional passing contributions on the field, in some range of the salary distribution. The 
significant, negative coefficients on pass yards achieved by black quarterbacks is further evidence 
of discrimination in compensation.   
  So the scorecard suggests progress has been made.  It is also suggested, though, that 







  15Table One 
Black Quarterbacks Who have Attempted  
at least 100 passes in a  
single NFL season in league history 
Black Quarterbacks 
Years with  
100 passes  
Attempted  Years 
James Harris  5  1971, 1974-77 
Joe Gilliam  1  1974 
Dave Mays  1  1977 
Doug WIlliams  7  1978-82, 1987-88 
Vince Evans  4  1980-81, 1983, 1995 
Warren Moon  15  1984-98 
Randall Cunningham  14  1986-90, 1992-95, 97-01 
Rodney Peete  10  1989-93, 95-98, 2002 
Jeff Blake   9  1994-2000, 2002-03 
Steve McNair   11  1996-06 
Tony Banks   7  1996-01, 2003 
Kordell Stewart   7  1997-03 
Charlie Batch  4  1998-01 
Donovan McNabb   8  1999-06 
Ray Lucas  2  1999, 2002 
Akili Smith  2  1999-00 
Shaun King   2  1999-00 
Daunte Culpepper   7  2000-06 
Aaron Brooks  7  2000-06 
Michael Vick   6  2001-06 
Anthony Wright  3  2001, 2003, 2005 
Quincy Carter   3  2001-03 
Byron Leftwich  4  2003-06 
David Garrard   2  2005-06 
Jason Campbell   1  2006 
Tarvaris Jackson   1  2006 
Seneca Wallace   1  2006 



















  16Table Two 
Percentage of NFL Quarterbacks who are Black: 1971-2006 





Quarterbacks Percent  Black 
1971 1  35  3% 
1972 0  31  0% 
1973 0  36  0% 
1974 2  38  5% 
1975 1  33  3% 
1976 1  36  3% 
1977 2  36  6% 
1978 1  33  3% 
1979 1  33  3% 
1980 2  36  6% 
1981 2  40  5% 
1982 1  30  3% 
1983 1  38  3% 
1984 1  41  2% 
1985 1  43  2% 
1986 2  41  5% 
1987 3  41  7% 
1988 3  44  7% 
1989 3  37  8% 
1990 3  37  8% 
1991 2  38  5% 
1992 3  42  7% 
1993 3  44  7% 
1994 3  43  7% 
1995 5  39  13% 
1996 5  43  12% 
1997 7  41  17% 
1998 8  42  19% 
1999 10  42  24% 
2000 11  35  31% 
2001 11  31  35% 
2002 10  37  27% 
2003 11  36  31% 
2004 6  37  16% 
2005 8  39  21% 
2006 11  36  31% 












  17Table Three 
Value in Net Points of  
Various Performance Statistics Tabulated for NFL Quarterbacks 
Variable Net  Points 
Yards (Passing or Rushing)  0.080  
Plays (Passing Attempts, Rushing Attempts, Sacks)  -0.214 
Interceptions -2.745 
Fumbles Lost  -2.899 
 
Table Four 











N 39  824  106  501 
Completion Percentage  54.8%  55.4%  57.6%  58.8% 
Passing Yards per Passing Attempt  7.07  6.95  6.77  6.81 
Touchdown Passes per Passing Attempt 4.18%  4.17%  4.01%  4.03% 
Interceptions per Attempt  3.79%  4.23%  3.02%  3.17% 
Quarterback Rating  75.32  73.46  79.08  79.67 
Passing Yards per Game  195.7  168.2  189.9  193.5 
Rushing Yards per Game  17.6  7.5  20.1  7.0 
Yards lost from Sacks per Game  16.5  14.9  13.4  12.6 
Plays per Game  33.3  28.1  34.2  32.5 
Yards gained per Game  196.8  160.8  196.6  188.0 
Fumbles Lost per Game  --  --  0.28  0.24 
Interceptions per Game  1.05  1.02  0.85  0.90 
Net Points per Game  4.9  3.4  6.0  5.5 
QB Score per game  57.2  39.7  60.3  56.4 
Yards per Play  5.90  5.73  5.75  5.78 
Fumbles Lost per Play  --  --  0.8%  0.7% 
Net Points per Play  0.146  0.120  0.175  0.170 
QB Score per Play  1.715  1.415  1.762  1.735 
Note:   Data from 1971-93 does not include fumbles lost.  So Net Points and QB Score  
  were each calculated without fumbles lost in the earlier time period. 
  From 1994-06, average black QB Score play, without fumbles, would be 2.005.  













  18Table Five 
Descriptive Statistics for Real Salary 
Deflated by NFL average  
Wage, 2000 base year 
White 
N = 435 
Black 
N = 95 
Mean  2,615,553 2.536,037 
Standard deviation  2,284,601 1,930,611 
10th percentile  413,224 471,033 
25th percentile  793,444 819,596 
Median  1,762,497 1,898,695 
75th percentile  4,110,626 3,938,629 
90th percentile  6,046,535 5.463,845 
Skewness  1.072 0.716 

































  19Table Six 




         Quantile 
Variable 0.1  0.25  0.5  0.75  0.9 










































































































































Pseudo R2 0.35 0.38 0.39 0.35  0.30 
N  530 530 530 530  530 
 
 
Note: In Tables Four through Seven dependent variable is log real salary for quarterbacks with 
positive pass attempts in previous season; sample period 1995-2006;  salary is deflated by average 

















  20Table Seven 




         Quantile 
Variable 0.1  0.25  0.5  0.75  0.9 








































































































































Pseudo R2 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.37  0.30 























  21Table Eight 




         Quantile 
Variable 0.1  0.25  0.5  0.75  0.9 




































































































































































































Pseudo R2 0.42 0.46 0.45 0.40  0.33 











  22Table Nine 




         Quantile 
Variable 0.1  0.25  0.5  0.75  0.9 
































































































































































Pseudo R2 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.40  0.31 
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1 For a review of the literature examining this issue prior to 1990's see Kahn (1991). More recent studies of 
racial discrimination in professional baseball have found that discrimination against blacks exists in the 
market for baseball cards [Andersen and La Croix (1991) and Fort and Gill (2000)], the hiring of NBA 
players [Hoang and Rascher (1999)], and the pay to players in the upper tier of the NBA’s income 
discrimination [Hamilton (1997)].  Evidence of customer discrimination against blacks was offered by 
Kanazawa and Funk (2001), Burdekin, Hossfeld, and Smith (2005), and Berri and Schmidt (2005). 
2 Hanssen and Andersen (1999) presented evidence that although blacks were discriminated against in the 
voting for baseball’s mid-season All-Star game in the 1970s, in the 1990s it is whites who suffer from 
discrimination.  This finding is echoed in basketball by McCormick and Tollison (2001), who find that 
black players are favored in the allocation of playing time. 
3 With respect to NBA salaries, Jenkins (1996), Dey (1997), Gius and Johnson (1998), Bodvarsson and 
Brastow (1998, 1999), and Eschker, Perez, and Siegler (2004) offer little evidence of discrimination. More 
recently, Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2004) failed to find evidence of customer discrimination in an 
examination of gate revenue in the NBA. 
4 The story of Willie Thrower is reviewed in Finder (2002).  
5 Although Briscoe finished second in the voting for the AFL’s rookie of the year, he was cut from the 
team before the start of the 1969 season.  Briscoe did enjoy a career as an NFL wide receiver, but he never 
played quarterback again. (Associated Press: February 22, 2005) 
6 The restriction of the sample to quarterbacks with 100 pass attempts follows from the work of Leeds and 
Kowalewski (2001). 
7 It is interesting to note that a team that contributed to the efforts to integrate the quarterback position in 
the NFL utilizes a racial epithet as its name.  
8 Career data for Marlin Briscoe, James Harris, Joe Gilliam, and Doug Williams can be found at 
http://www.pro-football-reference.com/ 
9 See Leeds and Von Allmen (2005). 
10As noted by Jenkins (1996), both the works of Quirk and Fort (1997) and Scully (1995) suggest that the 
utilization of an index, rather than using a multitude of separate statistics, provides a more accurate 
measurement of an individual player’s productivity. 
11  Slugging percentage was the primary measure of productivity employed in thirteen studies published 
from 1974 to 2002.  In addition to the Goff et. al. (2002), slugging percentage was employed by Scully 
(1974), Sommers and Quinton (1982), Raimondo (1983), Bruggink and Rose (1990), Hill (1985), Durland 
and Sommers (1991), Sommers (1993), Krautmann and Oppenheimer (1994), Krautmann (1999), 
Krautmann, Gustafson, and Hadley (2000), Maxcy, Fort, and Krautmann (2002), Krautmann and 
Oppenheimer (2002). Sommers (1993) also employed a player’s batting average while Krautmann, 
Gustafson, and Hadley (2000) added a hitter’s runs-batted-in. Slugging percentage has not been the only 
measure of productivity chosen.  Medoff  (1976), Hill and Spellman (1983), and MacDonald and Reynolds 
(1994) measured a hitter’s productivity with runs scored.  Such a choice ignores the impact a player’s 
hitting has upon the scoring of teammates.  Sommers (1990) utilized a player’s batting average, or simply 
hits divided by at-bats.  Batting average ignores the quality of a player’s hits and is generally considered 
inferior to slugging average.  Finally, Zimbalist (1992a, 1992b) utilized slugging percentage with a player’s 
on-base percentage in the construction of a summary statistic he labeled PROD.  PROD is better known 
today as OPS. 
  27                                                                                                                                                                      
12 Utilizing team baseball data from 1995 to 2004, one can explain 81% of the variation in a team’s runs 
scored with a team’s slugging percentage.  In contrast, a measure like OPS – which is on-base percentage 
plus slugging percentage – can explain 90% of runs scored.  Asher Blass (1992) employed a linear weights 
model, which consists of regressing the number of runs a team scored in the regular season on each teams 
accumulation of singles, doubles, triples, non-intentional walks, hit batsmen, stolen bases, sacrifice flies, the 
summation of double plays and caught stealing, and outs.  This model, when estimated with data from 
1995 to 2004, explains 94%.  Given both OPS and the linear weights model, it is surprising researchers still 
employ slugging percentage as the measure of a hitter’s output. 
13 ESPN.com, as well as other web sites, reports the equation for the NFL’s quarterback’s rating. 
14 Two models were detailed in Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2006) and Berri (2007). The first regressed the 
points scored by a team’s offense on factors associated with acquisition of the ball, the ability to advance 
the ball across the field of play, the ability to maintain possession of the ball, and the team’s ability to 
convert scoring opportunities into points.  A second model was estimated connecting the same factors for 
the opponent to the number of points allowed by a team’s defense.  From these two models we learn the 
impact passing yards, rushing yards, passing attempts, rushing attempts, sacks, interceptions, and fumbles 
lost have on offensive points scored and defensive points allowed.  
15 The salary we employ for the each player refers to the sum total of actual base salary, signing bonus and 
performance-related bonuses as posted by USA Today. Within this measure the signing bonus is treated as 
pro-rated across the duration of the contract. Finally, salaries are converted into real values at 1994 prices. 
16 Use of prior season productivity measures has the effect of reducing the sample size available for 
regression analysis from 607, as reported in the descriptive statistics in Table Four, to 530. 
17 A similar set of control variables appears in Simmons and Berri (2008). 
18 Alternative measures of on-field experience include career total plays, starts or games. The career pass 
attempts measure has the advantage of capturing a quarterback’s primary on-field function. Substitution of  
these alternative measures of experience does not affect the results reported below. When career pass 
attempts is included the R
2 value is slightly higher than when any of the alternative experience measures is 
used. 
19 The best quarterbacks are not necessarily round one draft picks as the current example of New 
England’s Patriots quarterback, Tom Brady (round six) testifies.   Brady led the Patriots to three Super 
Bowl titles in 2001, 2003, and 2004.   
20 Most trades occur in the off-season. 
21 We initially supplemented the population measure with the proportion of African-Americans in the 
SMSA population (BLACKPOP) as a proxy measure to capture possible customer discrimination (see both 
Bodvarsson and Partridge, 2001; Hamilton, 1997). However, this did not deliver significant coefficients in 
any of our estimations and was dropped from the analysis. A problem with this measure is that it does not 
vary through time. Our SMSA population measure is time-varying. 
22 On a similar basis, we could use OFFENSIVE LINE SALARY as a measure of offensive line ability. 
But in preliminary analysis, the coefficient on this measure was not significant and we exclude it from the 
reported estimates.       
23 Very similar results were found when we replaced QB Score by Net Points. The results with Net Points 
included are not reported to save space but are available from the authors on request.  
24 Inclusion of a further adverse characteristic, fumbles lost per play, results in an insignificant coefficient 
at all quantiles. 
25 We also interacted BLACK with TOUCHDOWNS PER ATTEMPT, COMPLETIONS PER 
ATTEMPT and INTERCEPTIONS PER ATTEMPT but these terms delivered insignificant coefficients 
at all estimated quantiles nd are omitted from the results in Table Eight. 
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